The Czech Republic has a new Concept for the Development of the Czech Armed Forces through 2040. It is more analytically open, more specific, and in many respects more modern than the previous document, which had a time horizon of 2035. At the same time, however, it reveals an uncomfortable truth: there is a strategic gulf between the kind of military the state needs, the kind it promises, and the kind it is actually willing to pay for. The most dangerous thing is not a lack of ambition. The most dangerous thing is when ambitions are passed off as capabilities and distant budgetary assumptions as final political decisions.

A new document presents an assessment that not only the government and parliament, but also every taxpayer, should be aware of. According to the analyzed concept, the Czech Republic is failing to meet approximately 70 percent of the Alliance’s capability-building goals; in the most demanding areas, the delay ranges from five to ten years. This is not a minor deviation from the schedule. It is an admission that the long-declared defense capability and the military performance that can actually be achieved are not one and the same. And if a threat can materialize without much warning, the year 2040 cannot automatically be considered a safe deadline for rectification.

Five More Years: Strategic Progress or an Admitted Delay?

The 2035 Plan envisaged two construction phases, six strategic goals, and stable funding at a level of at least two percent of GDP. The new plan extends the timeframe by five years, divides construction into three phases, and sets out eight goals. The difference lies not only in the scope of the document. The older approach primarily described a desired future state; the new one much more thoroughly identifies which capabilities are underfunded and which projects lack budgetary assurance. This is a welcome shift in the culture of strategic planning, but also an uncomfortable reckoning with unmet expectations.

Another significant shift is the change in the security context. Both concepts view Russia as a fundamental threat and anticipate a high-intensity conflict. The new one, however, places greater emphasis on shifting conventional defense responsibilities to European allies, a transparent battlefield, the widespread use of unmanned systems, and the blurring of the line between peace, crisis, and war. Defense, therefore, must not be measured solely by the number of tanks and aircraft. It must be measured by a state’s ability to detect a threat in a timely manner, make decisions, take action, replenish losses, and continue fighting.

The Hardest Number: Seventy Percent of Targets Unmet

The new concept is based on 64 quantitative and 50 qualitative NATO Capability Targets 2025. The requirements for these targets have increased significantly in some areas. The mere proportion of unmet targets cannot be mechanically translated into a 70 percent failure of the military without knowing their respective weights. Nevertheless, this is an extremely serious signal: Alliance commitments and actual national capabilities are diverging to an extent that can no longer be explained by individual delayed procurement contracts.

Even more telling is the assessment of the expected state of affairs in 2030 under a 2 percent funding level. According to the concept’s appendix, six of the eight assessed areas are projected to exhibit significant shortcomings: command and control, territorial forces, air defense, drone defense, non-kinetic operations, and logistics. The ground and air forces are expected to achieve only partial capability. If even by the end of the decade the military has not achieved sufficient balance, modernization cannot be viewed as a continuous path toward readiness. There is a risk of creating pockets of cutting-edge technology amid systemic weaknesses.

The New Army: 20–30–50 and the Total Forces Model

The Total Forces Model can be considered a truly conceptual innovation. Professional soldiers, active reserves, and a broader mobilization base are intended to form an integrated whole; units are distinguished based on whether they operate at peacetime strength, are being expanded for mobilization, or are still being formed. This represents an important shift from the notion that war can be managed exclusively by a peacetime professional army. At the same time, however, this model requires accurate personnel records, training, equipment, infrastructure, supportive legislation, and cooperation from the entire state. A mobilization table does not equate to a mobilization capability.

The new concept sets a target of 32,000 professional soldiers by 2030, whereas the previous document cited 30,000. The active reserve is to reach 10,000 by 2030 and subsequently 15,000. Recruitment targets of 3,000 professionals and 1,000 reservists per year appear measurable, but without a published baseline and a realistic model of attrition, they do not in themselves prove that these goals are achievable. If the military recruits 3,000 people and a significant portion of the current force leaves, statistically successful recruitment may be accompanied by stagnation in actual troop strength.

A second striking symbol of change is the 20–30–50 model: twenty percent sophisticated manned platforms, thirty percent reusable unmanned systems, and fifty percent disposable, mass-produced assets. This is an inspiring response to a war in which expensive systems are increasingly facing off against cheap sensors, drones, and precision munitions. However, a key question remains: percentages of what? The number of assets, their acquisition cost, or their resulting combat effect? Without a defined metric, a useful model can easily become an attractive slogan whose fulfillment cannot be verified.

Air Defense and Drones: A Priority That Must Wait?

The new concept elevates air and anti-drone defense to a separate strategic objective. This is logical. Experience from Ukraine confirms that it is not only frontline units that are vulnerable, but also airports, warehouses, transportation hubs, the energy sector, and infrastructure deep in the rear. It is precisely here, however, that one of the document’s sharpest contradictions arises: anti-drone defense is a declared priority, yet its development is being slowed in the first phase due to limited resources. According to the assessments in the appendices, significant shortcomings are expected to persist even in 2030.

Multilayered air defense – including medium- and long-range systems and ballistic missile defense – sounds similarly ambitious. However, the analyzed financial appendices identify some of these capabilities as unfunded, and the 2040 assessment for ballistic defense even notes a complete lack of capability. This is not a technical footnote. It is the difference between a politically communicated goal and the expected outcome. Citizens have the right to know whether the state is actually building the declared defenses or merely describing what it would like to have someday.

In the Army, a similar warning sign is the medium mechanized brigade. While the heavy brigade has a clearer link to ongoing acquisitions, the rearmament of the medium brigade remains unfunded in key areas. Earlier plans called for the procurement of wheeled infantry fighting vehicles as early as 2027–2029; a new analysis indicates a delay of several years and that the program will remain incomplete even by the end of the planning horizon. Having two brigades in the organizational structure does not mean having two equally prepared and sustainable combat units.

Four trillion on paper. How much has actually been decided?

The most fundamental weakness of the KVAČR 2040 lies in its financial structure. The underlying analysis outlines a total framework of approximately 4.31 trillion crowns for the Czech Armed Forces (AČR) for the years 2026–2040, of which only about 0.79 trillion is allocated to the first, relatively secure phase through 2030. The remaining approximately 3.52 trillion represents a projection dependent on future growth in defense spending, not an already approved 15-year budget. Approximately 82 percent of the envisaged funds thus lie beyond the scope of the current, more solid planning framework. To mistake this projection for a guarantee would be strategically dishonest.

A key assumption is a gradual increase in the Ministry of Defense’s spending to 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035. At the same time, the document highlights tensions with the fiscal-structural plan. In other words: the state is describing a military whose realization depends on political, budgetary, and economic changes that the concept itself cannot guarantee. This is not an argument against higher defense spending. It is a demand that its timing, legal framework, and actual purchasing power correspond to the declared commitments.

The investment projects listed are estimated in the supporting analysis to cost approximately 1.03 to 1.39 trillion crowns. However, the investment framework must also finance infrastructure, stockpiles, ammunition, unmanned systems, and other support capabilities. Furthermore, the acquisition cost is not the final cost of capability. Operation, maintenance, personnel, training, and the replacement of consumables create long-term costs. An illustrative upper estimate of life-cycle costs – 10 percent of the acquisition cost per year – cannot be automatically applied to every procurement contract; nevertheless, it illustrates the order of magnitude of potential operational costs. Unsustainable funding of operations can turn a modern army into an expensive showpiece.

Ninety Days of War: Ambition or Illusion?

Supplies represent perhaps the least media-friendly, yet strategically most important difference between the two concepts. While the older document assumed a minimum of thirty days of sustained intensive operations, the new one sets a target of ninety days for designated units. This change rightly responds to the experience of high ammunition and material consumption. However, according to the underlying analysis, the baseline in some categories ranges from a few days to a few weeks, and the appendix for the year 2040 allows for a range of thirty to ninety days. The declared goal, therefore, is not the same as the expected result.

Stockpiles are not passive inventory items. They require industrial capacity, transportation routes, storage, replenishment, protection, funding, and coordination with economic mobilization. If the military is preparing for a protracted conflict, it must be able to rapidly replace not only lost platforms but, above all, mass-consumed resources. It is not reasonable to fund a complex weapons system while simultaneously neglecting the ammunition without which its combat value is quickly exhausted. Public debate should therefore focus less on how much equipment we have purchased and more on how long we can actually fight with it.

Territorial Defense and Digital Warfare: The State Is More Than Just the Military

The new concept explicitly strengthens territorial defense, host nation support for allies, and the integration of peacetime and mobilization structures. Nevertheless, according to the analyzed assessment, the relevant capabilities will only reach a partial level by 2040. The protection of critical infrastructure, the movement of allied troops, the security of transportation corridors, and the functioning of the state under pressure cannot, however, be the sole responsibility of the Department of Defense. They require the involvement of regional and municipal structures, the police, firefighters, transportation providers, energy companies, industry, and the general public. The defense of the republic is not a departmental project; it is the responsibility of the entire state.

Another positive development is the more open identification of legislative obstacles. A crisis does not necessarily unfold according to the textbook sequence of peace-threat-war. The legal framework for the timely activation of defense measures, mobilization, and certain cyber activities therefore requires clear competencies, democratic oversight, and the protection of fundamental rights. Without legal tools, even a well-developed capability may be unusable at the decisive moment.

What the Document Still Doesn't Say: Plan B

The biggest methodological shortcoming is not the absence of additional modern technology, but the absence of a fully-fledged scenario for the event that defense spending remains close to two percent of GDP after 2029. The concept outlines a limited state in 2030 and an ambitious state in 2040, but it does not provide a systematically calculated alternative for 2040 without the planned growth. Yet it is precisely this scenario that should be a mandatory part of the decision-making process for the government, parliament, and the public. A strategic plan that does not illustrate the consequences of failing to meet its assumptions is incomplete.

The third gap is the lack of a system of publicly verifiable indicators. The number of soldiers, the duration of stockpiles, the availability of equipment, the training level of units, interoperability, the speed of mobilization, and the degree to which alliance goals are met should be monitored annually, to the extent compatible with the protection of classified information. Citizens do not need to know operational secrets to be able to verify whether expenditures amounting to billions are yielding commensurate capabilities.

A Decision for the Government: Do Not Scale Back Ambitions, but Remove Conditions

The first necessary step is to develop a scenario of expenditure stagnation – assessed in terms of both finances and capabilities – along with a realistic medium-range scenario and an ambitious option. For each scenario, it must be clear which alliance commitments, operational tasks, and readiness levels will be met and which will not.

The second step is to quantify the entire life cycle of capabilities, including ammunition, spare parts, training, personnel, and infrastructure.

The third is to link each strategic priority to a specific annual milestone, a point of accountability, and a publicly verifiable outcome.

At the same time, it is necessary to ensure the continuity of defense investments across electoral cycles and to accelerate the legislative, personnel, and industrial prerequisites for force development. What matters is not only the amount of money but also the ability to transform it into ready forces in a timely and effective manner. The defense industry must be able to scale production, the procurement system must shorten cycles, and the military must be able to absorb several large-scale modernization projects simultaneously. Otherwise, a larger budget may primarily result in higher prices and a longer backlog of uncompleted contracts.

KVAČR 2040 deserves credit for the candor with which it describes the legacy of the past. But candor is not a strategy in and of itself. The crucial question is: Will the Czech Republic in 2040 truly be capable of defending its territory, supporting its allies, and waging a protracted war, or will it merely have more comprehensive documentation of the reasons why it still cannot do so? Today, the government and parliament are not merely deciding on the military budget. They are deciding whether the time that the concept extends by another five years will be used to eliminate vulnerabilities or to postpone addressing them further.