In recent months, there have been many headlines and debates about defence. We have constantly discussed GDP percentages, modernization projects, and symbolic commitments. Then came new alliance capability targets, massive budget increases, and the promise that the Czech Republic would embark on a path toward an ambitious five percent of GDP for defence. However, it is precisely in this automation of big words that the greatest risk may lie: losing touch with the reality of the Czech environment. One thing I see clearly is that the Czech Republic does not lack ambition. What the Czech Republic lacks is capacity. And that capacity is not primarily about technology or money, but about people, infrastructure, and whether our institutions can keep pace with the reality of the security environment.

Sometimes in Czechia, we pretend that defence is a "project." That if we buy aircraft, we have an air force. If we buy tracked IFVs, we have a brigade. If we sign a memorandum, we have capability. But defence is not just a project. Defence should be a kind of culture. And that only arises when people know why they are doing something and where it is leading. Modernization is important, but without joint and political cultural change, it will never become anything more than a set of investments that will one day be included in a press release.

When I look at the reality of Czech defence, I see three challenges that will determine whether our strategies will have real substance. And at the same time, I see that it is precisely in these three areas that we have the greatest deficit.

The first challenge: modernizing the army versus personnel reality

The Czech Republic has embarked on an unprecedented wave of modernization, from F-35s, CV90s, Leopards, and air defence systems to logistics projects. On paper, it may look like a leap forward of a decade. However, there is a crack beneath this modernization that cannot be overlooked: the army, which needs over 37,000 professionals according to its new targets, actually has around 24,000. And the net annual increase, which represents a few hundred people, means only one thing. At the current rate, we will never reach the target. Moreover, the expenditure structure, which allocates only around 23% to personnel, is one of the lowest in the Alliance. And it's not just about recruitment. It's about the prestige of the profession, competitiveness in the labor market, the allocation of resources between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, the cultural perception of the army, and the fact that after twenty years of peace, society has ceased to understand the importance of defence readiness.

This brings us to the uncomfortable idea that the model of a fully professional army from the early 21st century no longer works. Not in light of Russian aggression. Not in the era of the drone revolution. Not in the face of new Alliance requirements. Modern conflict requires not only professionals, but also a broad society prepared for crisis. That is why I ask myself whether it is not time to open a debate that we have been avoiding for twenty years, namely the role of active reserves, the possibility of short compulsory training, voluntary longer service, or strengthening the national crisis minimum. This is not about a "return to war." It is about whether we have a society capable of surviving the first blow and continuing to function. Can we imagine the following model?

• Three months of intensive preparation for the entire year (defence, health education, cyber and crisis preparedness).

• Option to voluntarily continue for another 9 months with clear benefits.

  

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• Follow-up trip to Active Reserve, Integrated Rescue Service or professional services of the Czech Armed Forces.

However, is our society ready to conduct such a debate without hysteria? This is not about militarization. It is perhaps about pure realism, which appears to be transforming our western borders (Germany).

The second challenge: clean skies and the drone revolution 

If there is one area where the Czech debate lags behind, it is in the field of air superiority and unmanned systems. Future conflicts will not be decided solely by the number of tanks, but by the ability to maintain "clear skies" and technological superiority. This is especially true in the Czech context and given our commitments to the alliance. The F-35 is a crucial step in the right direction. But at the same time, it commits us, because we are taking on a role for which we must have a robust support system (and the aforementioned human resources). A single-layer air defence system is not enough. We need an integrated, multi-layer system, a modernized radar network, and interconnection with the alliance architecture.

This is where drones come in, an area where Czechia has enormous but untapped potential. Studies on drones from the Ukrainian battlefield show several key findings that should form the basis of the Czech strategy: (1) Drones have become the main means of reconnaissance, strikes, and psychological operations. (2) The revolution is coming from below: FPV drones costing hundreds of dollars are destroying equipment worth millions. (3) The battlefield is characterized by rapid innovation cycles. Adaptation takes place in days, not years. (4) Resilience to EW, autonomous modes, and AI in navigation and targeting are key. (5) Success is not ensured by technology alone, but by a combination of people, improvisation, and adaptation.

Ukraine has once again demonstrated that the winner of a war is the one who can innovate faster than their opponent. Mass production, cheap attack systems, decentralized development, 3D printing, industrial lines, adaptation in hours. This is the new reality we must accept. We have companies, we have engineers, we have academia. What we don't have is state coordination, unified demand, and the courage to create a drone ecosystem. This is not a nice accessory. Drones are the new artillery. The new air defence. The new espionage. A new industrial revolution that we should not sleep through. And here we come to another question: Should Czechia have a drone brigade? Unified command? Centralized development? A testing ground?

Third challenge: infrastructure as a hidden Achilles heel

Whether we are talking about logistics, Host Nation Support, warehouses, military facilities, or training areas, the Czech Armed Forces face the same problem as many citizens: construction paralysis. In practice, this means that key projects take years to complete, often due to conflicting laws, unclear responsibilities, and overburdened public administration. There is no fast-track procedure for critical security infrastructure. Interdepartmental coordination is minimal. And if we are unable to build a warehouse within a few years, we can hardly fulfill the role of a logistics hub for our allies. Infrastructure is boring, but critical. And if we don't start taking it seriously, we will remain a paper ally with modern toys that have nowhere to operate.

The third fundamental problem is therefore less visible, but the most limiting. The state's construction paralysis and logistical incompetence is reflected in:

• Ammunition depots: 5–7 years of permitting.

• Training areas: conflicting laws, resistance from municipalities, complex EIAs.

• HNS projects: dragging on.

• Critical infrastructure: no expedited procedure.

• Interdepartmental coordination: minimal.

We can buy F-35s, but where will the hangars be located? We can be NATO's logistics hub, but where are the terminals, warehouses, and railways? We can be an ally of first choice, but how, when we can't even build basic capacity? Without infrastructure, nothing will work. Not air defence, not drones, not the brigade, not mobilization.

What does this imply?

Czechia is on the threshold of the biggest security transformation since 1989. We have enormous ambition, but institutionally and socially we are still only halfway there. If we want to be a truly respected ally, we must align our ambition with reality and stop believing that GDP percentages are synonymous with security. And that will be the main task of the next government. To take over a country with ambitions but without capacity; with modernization projects but weak infrastructure; with technology but without people; with strategies but without a culture of defence.