After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, we were confronted with a new reality. New, that is, if we did not consider the events of 2008 (Georgia) and 2014 (annexation of Crimea) to be a strong enough impetus to fundamentally change our view of security. It is fair to say that it was an impetus, but the response was lukewarm and not at all fundamental. It was not until 2022 that we were awakened from our lethargy, but even then, the unity of the EU member states in particular was not as strong as might have been expected. It should be noted that despite all the reservations we may have about Ukraine (and there are plenty of objective ones), our continued strong support for Ukraine is one of the key contributions to resolving the security situation in Europe. This support, however harsh it may sound, costs us the least in terms of "our" victims, and if we talk about the financial impact, it is ultimately very cheap, despite all the speculation.

Paradoxically, however, our activity has intensified in recent months following the inauguration of the new president of our strongest ally (early 2025). With his statements, culminating in ideas about the need to control Greenland, and concrete actions, he is slowly causing us more concern than our long-standing adversaries.

This raises the question of whether the basic assumptions on which our positions and fundamental documents in the area of security and defense should be based are changing, and if so, to what extent. Discussions and conclusions regarding these assumptions should take precedence not only in top management but also in communication with the public over constant speculation about what specific technology (tanks, aircraft, howitzers, etc.) should be purchased, in what quantities, and when. And I am not even mentioning the tools of warfare in the cyber and cognitive environments, where imagination associated with specific things is severely limited. The numbers, types of equipment, and their acquisition are technical matters, and there are experts for that. The public expects the economical and efficient use of funds, i.e., the funds that taxpayers have entrusted to the state for this (and other) purposes. However, the public does not know much about the values and assumptions behind this, and if they do, it is only from the contradictions that are heard in the media. So let's try to write them down and think about them. They are the author's opinion, but they are certainly open to discussion.

Global strategic environment

• Long-term instability: The international environment will remain unstable in the long term, with an increasing frequency of crises, proxy conflicts, and hybrid activities. Reform should therefore be designed for a relatively long era of tension, not for a return to "peaceful normality."
• The return of power politics: The power politics of the superpowers (the US, China, Russia) will take precedence over multilateral rules and institutions, which will continue to erode. It is therefore necessary to expect the erosion of international institutions and a less predictable environment.
• Permanent "gray zone": Conflicts will mainly take place in the "gray zone" below the threshold of open warfare (cyber, information, economic pressure, sabotage), but with a direct impact on the security of the Czech Republic and Europe.
• Conflicts in several domains simultaneously: Modern conflicts take place simultaneously in three interconnected domains: 1. physical (kinetic operations, logistics, infrastructure, etc.), 2. virtual/cyber (networks, data, electromagnetic environment, etc.), 3. cognitive/information (perception, decision-making, legitimacy, will, etc.). Success in one domain is contingent on the ability to coordinate effects across all three. Reform efforts must be based on an integrated, systemic approach that links military, civilian, technological, and information capabilities into a single functional (eco)system.

The role of the US, Russia, and China

• Despite current problems, the US remains a guarantor of security, but with conditions: the US will continue to be a decisive military force and supporter of Europe, but at the same time it may selectively limit its involvement (emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, the so-called High North) and its activities in this direction are de facto "pushing" for significantly greater European defense self-sufficiency. This will cause tension not only between NATO and the EU, but also within the Alliance itself, and thus a qualitatively new form of discussion within the EU/Europe, and even within the closest circle of partners who share the same values and views.
• Russia as a long-term threat: Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will remain a long-term military threat to Europe's eastern flank (and NATO), with a high tolerance for risk and a willingness to sustain heavy losses (representing a "threat-credible deterrence" situation).
• China as a systemic rival: China is primarily a rival to Europe (and thus also to the Czech Republic) in the economic, technological, and information spheres, with an indirect but growing impact on military planning (dependence on raw materials, supply chain), which must be taken into account.
• Interconnectedness of threats: Crisis scenarios in Europe are not isolated but interconnected, primarily with events in the Indo-Pacific and the High North (distraction of US attention, Russia-China coordination, pressure on logistics chains).

The nature of future conflicts and the need for capabilities

• High intensity + long duration: A potential conflict in Europe will combine high intensity in the early stages with a long period of attrition – sustainability (ammunition, repairs, personnel replenishment, etc.) will be crucial.
• Technological leap and inexpensive (but effective) systems: The proliferation of inexpensive, relatively simple means (drones, loitering munitions, cyber tools) is fundamentally changing the requirements for air defense/airspace defense, force protection, camouflage, and electromagnetic warfare.

Cyberspace and information as a permanent battlefield

• Cyberspace and information space are "in a permanent state of war" even in times of peace; the Czech armed forces must be capable not only of defending themselves, but also of taking active measures (under clear political leadership and within a legal framework).

The European Union and NATO

• The EU as a (still) weak but necessary pillar: The EU will not become a fully-fledged military union in the foreseeable future (note: the statement puts it in other words), but it will remain a key framework for defense financing, industrial policy, sanctions, and resilience (energy, infrastructure, cyber, etc.). The Czech Republic must therefore actively use European instruments, but not rely on them in the area of "hard power."
• NATO as the primary defense framework: NATO will remain the fundamental framework for collective defense (and thus also for the defense of the Czech Republic), including nuclear deterrence, but allies will increasingly insist on the actual fulfillment of commitments (2+% of GDP, which de facto means 5% of GDP (3.5+1.5), capabilities, readiness). The issues mentioned in point 2.1 will pose a risk.
• Unclear division of labor between the EU and NATO: The "division of labor" between the EU and NATO is incomplete and partially overlapping; the Czech Republic must adapt to this by building capabilities that can be used in both frameworks (dual use, interoperability, etc.). Discussions on the possibilities of using force within the EU and changes to these will become more important than they have been to date.

Czech Republic: security and economic reality

• The Czech Republic as a country "close to the front line": Although it is not directly on the border with the aggressor, the Czech Republic effectively functions as a rear base for the front line (Ukraine). This makes it a target for cyber, information, and sabotage operations, and measures must be taken accordingly.
• The need for a permanently higher defense budget: Maintaining defense spending at a minimum of 2+% of GDP is becoming a long-term necessity, not a temporary "blip," and the actual requirements are higher (mainly due to the costs of modernization and future operations).
• Limited size and demographics: The strength of the Czech Armed Forces must lie in quality, a ready-to-mobilize reserve, and the effective use of technology (the significant use of modern technology will allow for the partial compensation of deficiencies in personnel numbers). Demographic trends will not allow a return to a mass conscript army in the style of the 20th century, but the current system must be fundamentally modified.
• Economic dependence and vulnerability: The Czech economy will remain highly dependent on exports, supply chains, and imports of energy and technology, which creates significant security vulnerabilities (energy, industrial capacity, critical infrastructure). Efforts to reduce this dependence must be made primarily within the EU.
• Domestic defense industry: Without a strengthened domestic defense and dual-use industry (especially in the areas of ammunition, air defense/missile defense, including anti-drone defense, C4ISR, drones, cyber capabilities, and equipment maintenance), the Czech Republic is unable to maintain its combat readiness in a high-intensity conflict in the long term (a strong, capable army cannot exist without a strong industrial base that is adequately supported by the state).
• Reserves and societal resilience: Without societal involvement (active reserves, defense elements in education, civil defense, crisis preparedness), a long conflict cannot be sustained, even if professional forces are well equipped.

Czech Republic: political will, social legitimacy, and institutional capacity

• Fluctuating political attention: Political attention to defense fluctuates according to the intensity of crises; reform must be designed to ensure continuity and survive changes in government and media cycles.
• The need for broader social legitimacy: Without fundamental social support for defense investment and a certain degree of "defense culture" (system change), any more ambitious reform will gradually erode.
• Institutional limit of state administration: State administration (including the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces) has limited absorption capacity with regard to the number of parallel large-scale projects; reform must be phased and prioritized, otherwise it will collapse during implementation.
• The need to link defense with other ministries: Modern defense is inseparable from internal security, industry, education, healthcare, and digitization; separate "ministerial" defense reform without coordination with other ministries will not suffice.
• In general: States and non-state actors will systematically attack the perception, judgment, cohesion, and decision-making processes of society, political leadership, and armed forces. The Czech Republic must expect that conflicts will be conducted in such a way as to paralyze the will to defend, question the legitimacy of institutions, create chaos and polarization, and disrupt decision-making. For this reason, among others, the Czech Republic must bring the army closer to the general public (primarily through territorial defense forces and reserves).

The Czech Republic's position among its allies

• The Czech Republic cannot be a "free rider" or a "mini superpower": The Czech Republic will not be able to cover the entire spectrum of capabilities, either financially or in terms of capacity; it must choose a basic, albeit relatively broad, spectrum and cover the rest with mobilization readiness and by "leaning" on the alliance/EU framework.
• Emphasis on interoperability and standardization: Interoperability with allies (especially neighboring countries, NATO and EU members) is crucial, both in terms of technology and in terms of doctrine, training, and command.
• Reputation effect: The way in which the Czech Republic approaches reform will affect its reputation in NATO/the EU – countries that "deliver what they promise" will gain greater influence over decision-making and access to industrial and technological projects.

The current situation is undoubtedly marked by challenges that have not been seen for a long time; one could even call it a turning point. However, for the same reason, it is also a time of extraordinary opportunities from a political, diplomatic, economic, security (defense), and communication perspective in the public sphere. Effective adaptation to this situation requires these opportunities to be properly assessed and exploited without undue delay.